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ABSTRACT Recently housing affordability has reached the agenda in Flanders and the Netherlands,
giving a good reason to present a review of the concept of affordability and different definitions. The
concept of short-term affordability, which is concerned with financial access to a dwelling and is
based on cash flows, is combined with the concept of long-term affordability, which is about the costs
of housing consumption. The use of these concepts is illustrated for Flanders and the Netherlands.
They show that each concept has its own uses and that they are not interchangeable. However,
both concepts indicate that in 2005 higher-income households, and especially homeowners (with
a mortgage), were relatively better off than lower-income households, particularly renters.
Homeowners’ higher income levels on average more than compensate for their higher expenses in
comparison with tenants; they also receive higher explicit subsidization and in times of rising prices
they also receive expected returns on housing.
KEY WORDS: Affordability, expenses, Flanders, housing, the Netherlands, user costs
Introduction
Affordability analyses may be based on out-of-pocket expenses needed by households
to finance their housing consumption or their user costs of the capital embodied in the
dwelling. This is not an exhaustive list, but it shows why Wilcox (1999) called the concept
of affordability of housing a ‘vexed’ one. It means different things to different people
(Quigley & Raphael, 2004, pp.191–192):
[it] jumbles together in a single term a number of disparate issues: the distribution
of income, the ability of households to borrow, public policies affecting housing
markets, conditions affecting the supply of new or refurbished housing, and the
choices that people make about howmuch housing to consume relative to other goods.
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The literature about housing affordability traditionally focuses on one type of affordability
concept. It is what Hancock (1993, p. 140) calls the ‘short-run costs’ being the out-of-
pocket cash flows or expenses that households make to finance the access to their home.
Hancock (1993, p. 140) contrasts this concept with the ‘long-run ability’ of households to
pay the so-called user costs or price of housing consumption.
While the user cost concept is often used in economic modelling of the housing market,
policy makers will be interested in an affordability concept that they can measure easily—
the out-of-pocket cash flows. Instruments such as housing allowances often are based on
a relationship (norms) between household income and these out-of-pocket cash flows.
Changes in these variables are based on facts and not on expectations of house prices and
of other variables necessary to calculate user costs. Consumers also often only take out-of-
pocket cash flows into account. Typical here would be to forget about depreciation when
calculating the costs of using a car in daily life.
However, affordability is not a one-dimensional concept, and a combination of more
than one concept will give better insight into the affordability of housing for consumers.
This paper aims to show how an affordability analysis for a country or a region can be
improved by a more comprehensive view on affordability: a combination of the short-term
and the long-term concept, which to the authors’ knowledge has not been promoted much
by other researchers (but see Doms et al., 2001; Quigley & Raphael, 2004). The analysis
will show that both concepts are not interchangeable and that each concept of affordability
has its own uses in analysing the complex interplay of variables that influence
affordability.
This will be illustrated with data for Flanders, one of the three Autonomous Regions
of Belgium, and the Netherlands. These ‘countries’ may be considered good choices from
a housing market point of view. They are countries with different housing markets (see
Table 1). Flanders may be ‘the country’1 in northwestern Europe, with the possible
exception of Germany, that has the smallest social rental sector expressed as a share of the
total housing stock, while the Netherlands has the largest social rental sector (Department
of the Environment, Heritage &Local Government (Ireland), 2004). Furthermore, Flanders
has a relatively large owner-occupied sector, while in the Netherlands it is relatively small.
The next section describes theoretical issues concerning the two concepts of
affordability. The methodology is then presented, showing how the two definitions were
put into practice for Flanders and the Netherlands. The results of the calculations are
presented in the fourth and fifth sections. Conclusions follow in the final section.
Table 1. Tenure distribution (%) in Flanders (2005) and the Netherlands (2006)
Tenure Flanders The Netherlands
Rented sector total 24.1 44.2
Social rented sector 5.6 35.2
Private rented sector 18.5 9.0
Owner-occupied sector total 74.4 55.8
With a mortgage 33.6 48.5
Without a mortgage 40.9 7.3
Free housing 1.5
Total households 100 100
Sources: Flemish Housing Survey (2005), WoON (2006), TU Delft/OTB calculations.
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Affordability in the Short and Long Run
Affordability is about three elements, as the often referred to definition by Maclennan &
Williams (1990, p. 9) (Freeman et al., 2000; Hancock, 1993, p. 129; Whitehead, 1991)
shows:
‘Affordability’ is concerned with securing some given standard of housing (or
different standards) at a price or a rent which does not impose, in the eyes of some
third party (usually government) an unreasonable burden on household incomes.
Looking at the definition of the price or rent, the concept of opportunity cost may be a
helpful one to distinguish between both concepts of affordability. Whitehead (1991, p.
873) defines affordability as ‘the opportunity cost of housing vis-a`-vis other goods and
services’ (see also Stone, 2006a). Opportunity cost of housing is then about ‘what has to be
foregone in order to obtain housing’ (Hancock, 1993, p. 129).
Opportunity ‘cost’ in relation to expenses in terms of what has to be forgone can be
regarded as using current household income for housing consumption instead of other
consumption (or saving). This forgone income for other purposes, called cash flows, cash
or out-of-pocket outlays or expenses, is used to finance the access to a dwelling at a
certain moment in time without taking into account any future, or for that matter past,
developments in these cash flows. It is about the out-of-pocket expenses of a household that
are needed to finance housing consumption at the moment of measurement. The label of
‘short run’ in connection with affordability will thus be an understandable one (Hancock,
1993). For tenants the expenses come in the form of rent; for owner-occupiers in the form of
expenses to finance the mortgage loan.
Long-run affordability is the long-run ability to finance housing consumption (Hancock,
1993). The long-run aspect is embodied in the term ‘cost’, which may not be equal to the
expenses. Such a distinction becomes necessary when in the (neo)classical economic line
of thought there is an investment good that generates a flow of services (see the seminal
article of Hall & Jorgenson, 1967), being housing services in the case of housing. It is these
housing services that are consumed, not the dwelling itself. The cost of using or consuming
such a service will have to be determined or attributed based on the purchase price of the
dwelling, the value changes of it and other costs of managing the dwelling. The user costs
of capital are thus the costs of using or consuming one unit of housing services during a
period. It is about the opportunity cost or revenue forgone of investing in housing instead
of putting the funds into the best alternative investment.
The owner of a dwelling will calculate the user costs of housing consumption to
determine the costs of one unit of housing services. If the owner is a landlord, the owner
will set the rent for the tenant at that level. If the owner is an owner-occupier, the owner
will impute this cost or ‘rent’ to the occupier. The rent is fictitiously set. In both tenures the
occupier ‘pays’ the costs or price of housing consumption. In theory, the price is equal for
the same quantity of housing services in renting and owner-occupation (see also
Himmelberg et al., 2005). In theory the rent as an expense will also be equal to the user
costs for the rental service, while for owner-occupiers expenses and costs of consumption
will differ.
According to the above definition of affordability, next to the price or rent of housing,
two standards will be needed to determine the extent of affordability of housing for
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households. The first is a standard of reasonableness of the price paid for housing
consumption in relation to income. With this standard it is possible to determine the size of
the group of households for whom housing will be unaffordable from an income point
of view.
Furthermore, without a standard for housing quality to be consumed it is not possible to
be certain whether housing indeed is unaffordable as quality influences this evaluation
(Thalmann, 2003). Housing can be unaffordable because of over-consumption, while it
can be affordable due to under-consumption. In the first case a household might be living
in a dwelling that is ‘too big’, such as in the case when older people whose children have
moved out may choose not to downsize. Over-consumption (or over-housing) may also
occur because of investing in ‘too expensive’ housing. Under-consumption (or under-
housing) occurs when households live in poor quality housing or housing which is ‘too
small’ in relation to household size (over-crowding) in order to keep housing affordable
within their budget.
Whitehead (1991) summarizes the above reasoning as follows:
only those households who given their income and the cost of their housing, could
not potentially consume the required level of housing without breaking the
affordability criteria are regarded as having a [affordability] problem. (p. 875)
The actual consumption pattern can differ from the potential one, either by personal choice
or by constraints (Hancock, 1993). If it is about personal choice—about not being willing
to pay the price—it is not an affordability problem. Neither would there be an affordability
problem in the cases of over-consumption or over-housing. In the case of constraints, e.g.
choosing between housing or other consumption, and either under-consuming housing or
under-servicing non-housing needs, unaffordability will be a reality. From an expenses’
point of view the latter situation has been called ‘shelter poverty’ (Stone, 2006a).
Definition of Expenses
For the tenant net rent consists of the difference between gross rent (the rent set by the
landlord) and housing allowances (see Table 2). Net housing expenses for homeowners
Table 2. Components of residual income in relation to the income of the tenant and the owner-
occupier
Tenant Owner-occupier
Gross rent* Gross housing expenses**
– Housing allowances – Fiscal effect income tax
¼ Net rent ¼ Net housing expenses
Disposable income Disposable income
– Net rent – Net housing expenses
¼ Residual income ¼ Residual income
Notes: *Gross rent includes any costs that the landlord will include in the rent calculation, also for
maintenance, property tax, etc. Gross rents could be set lower than market rents either by subsidy, by rent
regulation or by taking a loss (social landlord).**Gross housing expenses include the amounts for
financing, property tax and other property owner expenses, such as home insurance fees, ground lease
charges, property tax and owner’s share of maintenance.
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consist of the difference of the loan financing expenses (interest and repayment) and income
tax effects, such as the mortgage interest deduction. If accessibility of housing is the
concern, first it is necessary to relate expenses to income. In relating housing expenses to
income, the residual income concept is applied here (Stone, 2006a, 2006b) as opposed to the
ratio-approach (Hulchanski, 1995).2 The residual income is calculated by subtracting net
housing expenses from disposable income, for renters and owner-occupiers.
Definition of User Costs
In its simplest form, user costs of capital consist of the real interest rate i earned on the
value V of the investment. The real interest rate can be split into composing variables such
as holding costs and expected value change (Quigley & Raphael, 2004; see also e.g. Hall
& Jorgenson, 1967; Hendershott, 1988; Himmelberg et al., 2005; Poterba, 1984; Van
Order & Villani, 1982):
UC ¼ ðiþ h2 pÞV ð1Þ
where:
UC ¼ user costs
i ¼ real interest rate
h ¼ holding costs (depreciation, property tax, etc.)
p ¼ expected specific price change (inflation) of the dwelling
V ¼ value of the dwelling
The expected value change of a dwelling is to be regarded as the so-called specific or pure
price change. The specific price change is the inflationary component of the value change
(Garner & Verbrugge, 2007; Wigren, 1996). It is the price change of a dwelling with a
constant-quality package of services. Price changes reflecting quality changes in the
dwelling, such as improvements that would be regarded as new investment, are excluded
from the price change in this way. The expected value change can be estimated either
rationally or pragmatically via an extrapolation of recent developments (Diamond, 1980).
Next, income taxation will have an effect on the user costs because the returns to
housing may be taxed. As, normally, nominal returns are taxed in income tax, not real
returns, the interest rate and the specific price inflation in real terms will have to be
explicitly corrected in the formula for inflation (respectively i þ a and p þ a; Quigley &
Raphael, 2004).
UC ¼ ½ðiþ aÞð12 tÞ þ hð12 tÞ2 ðpþ aÞð12 tÞV ð2Þ
where:
a ¼ inflation
t ¼ income tax rate
Solving the expression yields:
UC ¼ ðiþ h2 pÞV2 ðiþ h2 pÞtV ð3Þ
The direction of the tax influence on user costs will depend on whether the real interest rate
plus the holding costs are smaller or larger than the real expected specific price change.
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Note that general price inflation has cancelled out of the equation when nominal interest is
tax deductible while capital gain (or loss) is taxed (tax deductible).
When nominal capital gain is not taxed in income tax in equation (2), general price
inflation will reduce the user costs, as well as the tax deductions for the real interest rate
and the holding costs:
UC ¼ ðiþ h2 pÞV2 ðiþ aþ hÞtV ð4Þ
Expenses Versus User Costs and Government Intervention
Based on the government intervention identified above, the rent allowances, the statement
that rent expressed as expenses will be equal to the user costs for the rental service, needs to
be specified. In theory, in the first instance user costs will be equal to gross rent (Table 2),
which is the price set by the landlord, being the costs necessary to produce the housing
services. In practice, there may be a difference between both amounts caused by, for
example, rent regulation or supply subsidization. Furthermore, if there is demand
subsidization, for example, rent allowances, the price set by the landlord (including supply
subsidization) and the price paid by the tenant will differ and the latter price should be
called costs of occupation.
For owner-occupiers, expenses to finance the access to the dwelling and costs of
consumption will differ regardless of the type of government intervention aimed at the
owner of the dwelling because the composing variables differ. Both concepts take the tax
treatment of funds invested in the owner-occupied dwelling into account, but differently.
Expenses only take debt financing into account, while user costs also include the interest
costs of equity financing. Only when there is ‘other’ demand subsidization than income tax
subsidies, the costs paid for the occupation will differ from the user costs.
Methodology
Generally, data on housing expenses are collected by means of housing surveys, as is the
case for the data that used here for Flanders and the Netherlands. Expenses are measured
according to the definitions given in Table 2. User costs, however, are not readily available
in surveys or statistics; thus assumptions have to be made. First, the case here will abstract
from the possible differences between rent based on user costs and rent paid by tenants.
It is assumed that both are equal. User costs (e.g. the costs of occupation3) for tenants are
assumed to be equal to net rent as defined in Table 2.
Contrary to renting, for owner-occupation the user cost calculations need further detail
about assumptions which are contained in Appendix 1. The Appendix also contains a more
technical description on how in two counts the user costs of homeownership may be
underestimated in both countries. On the one hand, house price data are used for a period
where they were historically high; on the other hand, nominal rates of interest and specific
price change are used. Given the possible underestimation, the user costs that are
calculated can be considered the minimum amount.
As has been shown, measuring affordability requires definitions of price, income and
quality standards. For the purposes of this contribution, however, the study did not
design standards for quality or reasonableness. Technically, it is not possible to speak of
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measuring affordability, but of measuring housing expenses and costs. This paper will thus
show neither the quality being consumed nor whether households chose a certain level of
expenses or costs voluntarily or by restriction (Hancock, 1993; Stone, 2006b; Whitehead,
1991).
Databases and Selections of Households
For the analysis of short-term affordability, a group of recently moved households was
selected because they had dealt with the most recent situation on the housing market and
the associated housing policy.4 The group of households who moved during a period of
five years before the survey date were analyzed. For the Netherlands the period was 2001–
2006; for Flanders, the period was 2000–2005. With regard to the analysis of the owner-
occupied sector, the homeowners who had taken out a mortgage were selected. An
affordability analysis in the sense of financial accessibility is less relevant for the group
without a mortgage, as their gross housing expenses only include property tax and
homeowner’s maintenance expenses.
The long-term affordability analysis was carried out for all the households who moved
during a 10-year period before the survey date. Preferably, the study would have included
all households. This was not possible because the Flemish Housing Survey 2005 does not
include information on house prices for the households who moved before 1995 (for the
sake of memory bias).
In order to not only present averages for households per tenure, but a distribution of
affordability across households, the study used tertiles of equivalent income for the
expenses and quintiles for costs. Equivalent income is calculated by correcting the
disposable household income for the household composition. The OECD modified
equivalence scale was applied.5 Tertiles of equivalent income are calculated by dividing
the income distribution, of the total population or a subpopulation (e.g. the renters), in
three equal parts. The 33 per cent lowest-income households form the first tertile, whereas
the third tertile consists of the 33 per cent of households with the highest equivalent
incomes. Similarly, five quintiles of equivalent income are calculated for the user cost
analyses. The lowest quintile represents the 20 per cent lowest equivalent incomes.
Interplay of Variables: Government Intervention
By presenting the results not only as averages for tenants and owner-occupiers but also
corrected for household composition, possible differences in household types in the two
groups are taken into account. The focus is on the influences of government intervention
on expenses and costs for the different income groups in the different tenures. Next to
general economic variables (such as interest rates), financial variables (such as type of loan
and loan-to-value ratio) and specific housing variables (such as house price), the effects of
certain government intervention can be highlighted, differently for expenses and costs.
Government intervention usually takes the form of financial support, which explicitly or
implicitly lowers expenses and or costs. The lowering of expenses or costs will be called a
housing subsidy.6
An example of an implicit subsidy is the effect of rent regulation on gross rent and thus
on user costs (e.g. costs of occupation). This is the case in Belgium where the federal
legislation is applicable in Flanders (Elsinga et al., 2007). It limits rent increases for sitting
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tenants in the private rental sector to the rate of inflation for the duration of the contract
(maximum of nine years). For new contracts, there is no regulation. In contrast, rent
control in the Netherlands affects existing and new contracts in 95 per cent of the rental
sector. Rent increases for sitting tenants are determined by a political decision, while rent
levels for new contracts are based on the quality of the dwelling and, to some extent, the
environment. There is a maximum rent level per dwelling, determined by specified quality
criteria. In both rental tenures the rent is lower than the maximum rent, but for social
renting it is almost 19 per cent lower than in private renting because of implicit
subsidization by social landlords (Ouwehand & Van Daalen, 2002).
In Flanders there is another element of implicit subsidization when rents in the social
sector are also set according household income. Differential rent setting can be considered
an implicit housing allowance (Kemp, 1997). In contrast, in the Netherlands housing
allowances are an explicit subsidy to low-income households. One Dutch tenant out of
three received a housing allowance amounting to e148 per month in 2006 (Ministry of
VROM, 2007). In Flanders, a means-tested housing allowance is also available, but it is
selective and aims to assist low-income households who move from a poor quality rental
dwelling to a good-quality, rental dwelling. In 2005, 2 per cent of tenants received this
allowance, averaging e120 per month per beneficiary (Heylen et al., 2007).
For owner-occupation, the non-taxation of capital gains can be considered an implicit
subsidy; the tax deduction of interest of debts and equity (only user costs) are considered an
explicit subsidy. In the Netherlands, mortgage interest is fully deductible against progres-
sive tax rates for a period of 30 years (Haffner & De Vries, 2009). The system encourages
people to take out interest-only mortgages. In 2006, more than 44 per cent of homeowners
with one mortgage had one and 76 per cent of those with a combined mortgage had one
(Ministerie van VROM, 2007). The tax deduction is marginally offset by a tax on imputed
rent, amounting to less than 1 per cent of the market value of the property in an unoccupied
state. InBelgium (1989–2005),mortgage interest and part of themortgage repayment could
be deducted from taxable income for a limited period. This tax reliefwas limited by different
ceilings and was positively related to the mortgage sum (De Meyer, 2007).
Furthermore, implicit subsidies determine the level of gross expenses or user costs.
In Flanders these are a lower VAT-rate for renovation costs, a lower property tax rate
for families with children or the lower transaction tax rate for houses with a low cadastral
income (Doms et al., 2001). In the Netherlands, periodic grants for lower-income
homeowners exist, as well as a government mortgage guarantee (lower interest than
otherwise would be), as well as a government guarantee for loans of social landlords
(Oxley & Haffner, 2010).
In sum, the effects of the explicit subsidies on expenses and costs are discussed in the
next sections; the effects of the implicit subsidies generally will remain a ‘black box’. One
exception here is the difference in gross rent/user costs between social and private tenants
in Flanders. The comparison of the two tenures gives an impression of subsidization in
social renting in comparison with only slightly regulated market rents. For Dutch rents this
effect will be much smaller.
Expenses: Flanders and the Netherlands Compared
Table 3 shows the results of the short-term affordability calculations for the different
housing market sectors in Flanders and the Netherlands for households who had recently
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moved (2005/2006). In both countries the differences in disposable income between
homeowners with a mortgage and tenants compensated for the higher net housing
expenses for homeowners compared to tenants. In Flanders the average residual income
per month was more than e1200 higher in the mortgaged owner-occupied sector than in
the rental sector (2005); in the Netherlands the difference in residual income between both
tenures on average amounted to e1100 per month (1 January 2006). As a result, the
difference in short-term affordability between the rental sub-sectors and mortgaged
homeownership was also greater in Flanders than in the Netherlands.
For the rental sub-sectors a similar description can be given of the proportions as for the
difference between owner-occupation and renting. Gross social rent is much lower than
gross private rent, more so in Flanders than the Netherlands. Given that social rented
dwellings on average do not have fewer rooms than private rented dwellings (Heylen &
Haffner, 2009), the implicit bricks and mortar subsidies involved in combination with
the differential rent setting in the Flemish social rented sector must be substantial.
Furthermore, on average the income differences between both rental sub-sectors are
similar in both countries (e452 versus e394 per month), the income being lower for social
than for private tenants. As a result of the higher incomes and the higher rents, the average
residual income is considerably higher in the private than in the social rented sector. It is
clear from these numbers that on average in both countries the social rental sector caters
for the lowest-income households.
On average, the amounts of explicit government intervention are considerably lower in
Flanders than in the Netherlands. In Flanders, the housing allowances on average have a
small effect (whereas the implicit subsidization that shows in the social rents has the most
effect), while in the Netherlands the rents charged become clearly much lower (‘more
social’) as a result of housing allowances. The fiscal effect for homeowners is also higher in
the Netherlands than in Flanders (e308 versus e84). However, this greater government
intervention in theNetherlands is compensated for by higher gross housing expenses (e1074
versus e830), which results in a similar average amount of net housing expenses in both
countries. This effect of demand subsidization translates into house prices estimated to be
Table 3. Components of residual income according to tenure for recent movers, average amounts in
euro per month, Flanders/the Netherlands, 2005/2006
Gross rent/
gross housing
expenses
Housing
allowance/
fiscal effect
Net rent/
net housing
expenses
Disposable
income
Residual
income
Flanders
Rented sector 423 22 421 1814 1393
Private rented sector 453 21 452 1884 1432
Social rented sector 258 22 256 1433 1177
Owner-occupied sector* 830 284 746 3349 2603
The Netherlands
Rented sector 421 247 374 1631 1257
Private rented sector 501 219 482 1927 1445
Social rented sector 394 256 338 1533 1195
Owner-occupied sector* 1074 2308 766 3127 2361
Notes: *owner-occupiers with a mortgage.Sources: Flemish Housing Survey (2005), WoON (2006), TU
Delft/OTB calculations.
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10–30 per cent higher (Conijn, 2008) in theNetherlands, where house prices averaged e223
000 in 2005 in comparison with e164 0007 in Flanders, which must be ascribed to the
relatively inelastic supply. Another part of the explanation of the difference in gross
expenses between both countries may be the higher loan-to-value ratio in the Netherlands
for first-time buyers (101 per cent) than in Flanders (80 per cent), although the loan term
differences of 30 versus 20 years will work in the opposite direction (ECB, 2009).
Table 4 shows the housing expenses and residual income according to tenure and
income groups (tertiles) for Flanders. The results account for household type differences
between the different tenures, since the tertiles are based on disposable income corrected
for household composition (equivalent income). The gross rent for tenants and the gross
housing expenses for owners rise with income tertile. However, the short-term affordability
turns out relatively worse for tenants than for owner-occupiers with a mortgage as a result
of the income differences between both tenures. The difference in residual income
corrected for household composition is about a factor two between both tenures, implying
that homeownership with a mortgage is about twice as affordable as renting.
In contrast to the Flemish situation, the Dutch differences in income between owning
and renting are less than a factor two in all tertiles (Table 5). However, as in Flanders,
affordability for mortgagors is much better than for tenants for the same reason as in
Flanders. On average, the lower incomes of tenants determine their relatively worse short-
term affordability, even though their net rents, including implicit and explicit subsidization,
on average are lower than the net housing expenses of homeowners.
Even though homeowners’ short-term affordability is better in both countries than that of
tenants, government support as determined by the partial analysis here of explicit
subsidization is in favour of owner-occupiers with amortgage, who on average in all tertiles
are deducting larger amounts of income tax than tenants receiving housing allowances. The
effect of targeting is very limited. It is even absent in the Netherlands where the average
fiscal effect for owner-occupiers increases between the second and third tertile, showing the
effect of the unlimited mortgage interest deduction based on high house prices and high
loan-to-value ratios. The effect of targeting is limited to some extent in Flanders because the
average effect in the third tertile is not significantly higher than in the second, even though
gross housing expenses are, on average,more than e240 permonth higher in the third than in
the second tertile. This is the result of the built-in upper-limits of the tax system.
Table 4. Components of residual income according to tenure and tertiles of equivalent income for
recent movers, average amounts in Euro per month, Flanders, 2005
Gross rent/gross
housing expenses
Housing allowance/
fiscal effect
Net rent/net
housing expenses
Disposable
income
Residual
income
Rented sector, equivalent disposable income tertiles
1 358 24 354 1125 771
2 418 21 417 1645 1237
3 488 0 488 2617 2129
Owner-occupied sector with a mortgage, equivalent disposable income tertiles
1 699 260 639 2325 1686
2 769 292 677 3111 2434
3 1011 298 913 4540 3627
Source: Flemish Housing Survey (2005).
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Nonetheless, subsidy targeting in the rental sector is much stronger, especially through
the use of subsidized or social rents. In the Netherlands, targeting is also much stronger
for tenants than for owner-occupiers, in this case as a result of housing allowances.
Government intervention not only affects the financial accessibility to housing of
households, but also the income distribution of households. When taking the step from
disposable to residual income the basic result is that expenses for housing increase the
income inequality in both tenures and in both countries, as measured by the ratio of the
average disposable (or residual) income of the third tertile to the same average of the first
tertile. The increase in the ratio indicates that housing is relatively less affordable for low-
income than for high-income households.
On average, in both countries inequality is higher in the rental sector before and after
housing costs, and also increases more in the rental sector than in the owner-occupied
sector when taking the step from disposable to residual income. This indicates that housing
is relatively less affordable in the rental sector than in owner-occupation with a mortgage.
The targeted housing allowances in the Netherlands contribute to a smaller increase in
inequality (from 2.5 to 2.8) than in Flanders (from 2.3 to 2.8), which implies more
effective demand side subsidization for tenants in the former than in the latter country. For
homeownership it is the other way around. Tax subsidization for mortgagors contributes to
a stronger income inequality rise in the Netherlands (from 2.1 to 2.5) than in Flanders
(from 2.0 to 2.2), implying relatively less effective subsidization of the taxpayers in the
Netherlands. Regardless of the size of the effects, in both countries, subsidization makes
owner-occupation more attractive, the higher the income.
User Costs: Flanders and the Netherlands Compared
Table 6 presents the yearly user costs of housing in Flanders and the Netherlands, for
households who moved during the last 10 years (before the year of the survey). The results
are shown according to tenure and equivalent disposable income. Figure 1 and 2 show the
yearly user costs for owner-occupiers per income quintile divided according to cost
(positive) and revenue (negative) components, for both countries.
When the ‘expected price change’ component is excluded, the yearly user costs for
owner-occupation were, on average, slightly higher in the Netherlands (e12 290) than in
Table 5. Components of residual income according to tenure and tertiles of equivalent income for
recent movers, average amounts in Euro per month, the Netherlands, 2006
Gross rent/gross
housing expenses
Housing allowance*/
fiscal effect
Net rent/net
housing expenses
Disposable
income
Residual
income
Rented sector, equivalent disposable income tertiles
1 370 291 279 974 695
2 407 244 362 1518 1156
3 485 25 480 2401 1921
Owner-occupied sector with a mortgage, equivalent disposable income tertiles
1 901 2191 710 2129 1419
2 1024 2282 742 2862 2120
3 1297 2450 847 4390 3543
Notes: *Housing allowance received is based on income in reference period. That income may not be
equal to the income measured in the survey. Source: WoON (2006), TU Delft/OTB calculations.
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Figure 1. Composition of annual user costs (Euro) of Flemish owner-occupiers according to
quintile of equivalent income, 2005. Source: Flemish Housing Survey (2005).
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Figure 2. Composition of annual user costs (Euro) of Dutch owner-occupiers according to quintile
of equivalent income, 2006. Source: WoON (2006), TU Delft/OTB calculations.
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Flanders (e12 066). This indicates that the estimated specific price rise in Flanders was
higher than in the Netherlands. This explains why the user costs of owner-occupation in
Flanders are lower than in the Netherlands.
In fact, when all user cost components are included and corrected for government
intervention on the demand side, the user costs of owner-occupation in 2005 turn out to be
a return: revenue components exceed cost components. On average, owner-occupation
yielded a yearly profit of e7637 for Flanders and e4128 for the Netherlands. The user costs
turned ‘negative’ for 2005 because of the strong influence of the expected price change,
which on average was higher in Flanders (e19 703) than in the Netherlands (e16 418).
In Flanders, the expected price rises between the first and the third income quintile
whereas it is remarkably low in the fifth quintile (Figure 1). This finding can be explained
by the way household income is related to the expected value change of the dwelling, which
happens in two opposing ways. On the one hand, higher-income households on average
occupy dwellings of a higher value than lower-income households, which contributes to a
greater value change. On the other hand, the average yearly price-rise of large dwellings in
the five-year period (1.1 per cent) was far less than the price-rise of medium-size dwellings
(10.7 per cent) or apartments (9.3 per cent). Logically, high-income households more often
own relatively large dwellings than households with a lower income. As a consequence, the
expected price change in the fifth income quintile is below average, resulting in a
significantly lower user ‘gain’ in the fifth than in the other quintiles.
In addition for the Netherlands, the expected value change rises with equivalent income,
with the exception of the first quintile (Figure 1). The higher amount of estimated expected
value change in this quintile than in quintiles 2 to 4 must either be an effect of the result of
geographic differences (the dwellings are in provinces with higher value changes) or of the
higher value of the dwelling owned. The latter argument is supported with the higher
interest costs calculated for owner’s equity in the first quintile compared to the other
quintiles. Presumably, older, retired homeowners with a small or no mortgage and a
relatively lower income cause this effect. This group of households is over-consuming
housing services.
Figures 1 and 2 show that the interest costs on debt and on owner’s equity are the most
important components of the user cost after price effects. On average, the Dutch mortgage
interest costs are higher than the Flemish ones, which will be partly due to higher house
prices in the Netherlands. In addition, the ratio of the amount of mortgage interest to the
amount of interest on owner’s equity is higher in the Netherlands than in Flanders, which
indicates that on average the loan-to-value ratio is higher in the Netherlands when
mortgage interest rates are comparable. This finding clarifies that the equal housing
expenses that are on average paid by the Flemish and Dutch mortgagors are made for a
relatively larger part of the dwelling value in the Netherlands than in Flanders. As a
consequence, when the whole dwelling value is considered, costs (without the effect of the
specific price increase) are on average higher in Flanders than in the Netherlands. When
purchasing a dwelling, Flemish households tend to bring in more own equity, which
lowers the mortgages payments but which has to be accounted for when housing
‘affordability’ is examined in the long term.
Returning to Figures 1 and 2, it is found that the tax relief for mortgage debt and owner’s
equity in most quintiles are the lowest amounts in both countries of all the components that
make up user costs, but much more so in Flanders than the Netherlands. The first reason for
the difference is the smaller fiscal effect on the interest on owner’s equity because of the
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lower proportional tax rate of 15 per cent in Flanders than the Dutch tax rate of 30 per cent.
Second, as loan-to-value ratios in the Netherlands tend to be higher than in Flanders, Dutch
tax rates are progressive and the whole amount of mortgage interest is deductible, the
mortgage interest deduction in the Netherlands is bigger than in Flanders and increases with
income. As a result of the progressive tax rate the share of the amount of interest deducted in
the amount of mortgage interest increases with income, while in Flanders the share of the
amount of tax deduction to amount of mortgage interest decreases with income because of
some built-in upper limits for tax relief related to the value of the dwelling.
Finally, Figures 1 and 2 show holding or management costs. On average, in the
Netherlands the share of the management costs is more than 40 per cent of the user costs
excluding the estimated expected price change of the dwelling. In Flanders, this share is 25
per cent because it excludes costs of the land lease and the building insurance. Otherwise
these costs consist of maintenance costs, property tax and depreciation of the dwelling in
both countries.
According to theory, the user costs of renting would be equal to the user costs of owner-
occupation. However, that was not the case in 2005: while owner-occupiers were in fact
earning a return on living in their own dwelling, tenants were paying rent (Table 6).
Therefore, in 2005 owner-occupation was thus more affordable in the long term than
renting. One reason for this outcome is the regulation of rents. A second reason is about
quality differences between the tenures. On average, in both countries owner-occupied
dwellings are of better quality than rental dwellings (Elsinga et al., 2007). Another reason
is methodological: the ex post calculation of house prices over a relatively short period
(see above).
On average, social renting was more affordable in the long term than private renting in
2005. The combination of differential rents, bricks and mortar subsidies and housing
allowances in the social sector resulted in a much lower average rent in Flanders (e2998)
than in the Netherlands (e4092). Although the annual user costs for the private tenant were
on average also lower in Flanders (e5328) than in the Netherlands (e5653) due to the much
larger private rental sector, the user costs for renting were higher in Flanders than in the
Netherlands. In the Netherlands they increased with income more linearly than in
Flanders, probably as a result of the more widely applied means-tested housing allowance
in the Netherlands.
Conclusions
This paper has argued that two concepts of affordability should be used together in order to
outline a more comprehensive picture of affordability. The first concept is short-term
affordability, which is concerned with financial access to a dwelling based on out-of-
pocket expenses; the second is long-term affordability, which is about the costs attributed
to housing consumption. The analyses here of the most recent Flemish and Dutch data
available on affordability show that each concept has its own uses, that they are not
interchangeable and that they complement each other. Together they provide information
on the financial accessibility of housing in the short term and the capability to pay for
housing in the long term.
The analyses show that in 2005 homeowners (with a mortgage) ‘cashed in’ twice on
affordability. In the short term this conclusion can be explained by the fact that the share of
income spent on necessary goods and services will decrease as income rises.
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As homeowners on average have higher incomes, homeowners with a mortgage are
relatively better off than tenants. The differences between both tenures are greater in
Flanders than in the Netherlands. This effect mainly occurs because of the greater
differences in disposable income between the housing market sectors in Flanders than in
the Netherlands. These income differences are related to the policy-set income boundaries
in social housing and the different shares of the sectors in the housing market in Flanders
and the Netherlands.
In the long term, the difference between homeowners and tenants results from the yearly
expected value gain of the dwelling surpassing the other annual cost components. Owner-
occupation yields a profit regardless of the income level under the assumptions that were
made. Assuming this profit as a result of the expected value gain also is accruing to
landlords, rents could be lowered to a certain required, market, return. As they had not
actually been lowered, tenants were paying rent, while homeowners had negative housing
costs, resulting in a yield from living in their own dwelling in 2005/2006. This shows that a
dwelling is thus more than just a way to satisfy consumption in the form of the provision of
a roof above the head.
The expected price rise or decrease is an important aspect of housing affordability that is
being overlooked, when expenses are the guiding principle for housing affordability
policies. It is an expression of the risk that the investor runs when investing in housing.
Housing equity is also potential income that is often found to create a so-called wealth
effect, giving an incentive to increase (or decrease) consumption (Case & Quigley, 2008).
However, the analyses here show that the expected specific price change is not linearly
linked to equivalent household income. Rather, it redistributes housing equity in the
direction of more for the Dutch ‘poor’ and less for the Flemish ‘rich’. This comes about as
the expected price change for the Dutch ‘poor’ is more than average and for the Flemish
rich is less than average. The size of the dwelling is the intermediating variable between
price change and income. In the case of the Netherlands, pensioners with repaid mortgage
loans and relatively expensive homes (over-consumption) are over-represented in the first
income quintile, which distorts the linear relationship between equivalent income and the
expected value change. In Flanders, the expected price rise is higher for medium-sized
dwellings and apartments than for large dwellings, resulting in a lower than expected value
change for the highest income quintile. As a result of the importance of the value change,
several other aspects such as activity status or differentiated value change rates have an
impact on housing affordability in the long term.
Thus, in the case of long-term affordability the intermediary variable between
household income and affordability is the value of the dwelling, making the linearity of
this relationship not a necessity. In the short term that link, as is shown here, is expected to
be more linear than in the long term. Cash flows usually are linked to income, especially by
borrowing constraints (loan-to-income requirements) for mortgage loans, simply by the
fact that a household also will have to pay for non-housing consumption, and by
requirements for income subsidies for occupiers (here rent allowances).
In theory, the expected price adjustments in the long term would play a role in both
tenures and the user costs in both tenures would be equal to each other. The fact that this
did not turn out to be the case in the calculations here implies that homeowners have high
expectations about future capital gains, which is an effect that comes about because of
using ex post house price data for a relatively short period of time. Even if a longer period
would be used, differences between both tenures in user costs will remain because of rent
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regulation, which keeps rents below market rents and also because of quality differences
between both tenures.
On explicit subsidies (here defined as lowering expenses or costs) to make housing more
affordable, the analysis points out that housing allowances have the same impact on costs
as on expenses and are targeted at low-income households in both countries. For
homeownership the share of the tax effect in costs and expenses is different, much lower as
a cost component than as an expense component. In the short term the tax effect increases
with income in both countries. In the long term this effect is only visible in the
Netherlands, while in Flanders the capping of the tax deduction for higher-income groups
is much clearer in the cost concept than in the expense concept, probably because
the analysis distinguishes between five income groups instead of three. Furthermore, the
short-term concept shows that the average fiscal effect is about three times higher in the
Netherlands than in Flanders. Nevertheless, the net housing expenses for homeowners
with a mortgage are at approximately the same level in both countries. The long-term
analysis complements this finding in that it points out that the loan-to-value rates for
homeowners are on average higher in the Netherlands because the about equal housing
expenses are made for a larger share of the dwelling value than in Flanders. This shows
that when housing policy is only based on the more popular, short-term analyses, policy
adjustments might be ineffective. What is not visible in this approach is the effect of policy
on dwelling value. Any demand subsidization will in the end benefit the owner of the
dwelling, because subsidizing demand will increase the demand for housing services as
well as the price, if supply is inelastic.
The Way Forward
These findings point out that the two applied affordability approaches complement each
other and that a combination of a short and long-term analysis will deliver a more
complete understanding of housing affordability. It is important to realize that this analysis
is a partial analysis, focusing on the price of housing consumption as expressed by
expenses and as expressed by costs. The results show whether a group pays more or gets
more subsidy without being able to state whether the expenses and costs that households
are confronted with are affordable for the individual households.
In order to determine affordability in a more exact way, two other aspects are needed: a
standard of reasonableness for the price of housing consumption in relation to income and
a standard for housing quality. Therefore, there are at least two further areas to which the
combination of the two affordability concepts can contribute. This is in addition to the
combination of expenses with specific price changes to take the investment aspect into
account, and to the financing of the consumption aspect. Another point is to make a
comprehensive analysis of all the implicit and explicit subsidies involved. The cash flow
subsidies will have to be distinguished from the cost price subsidies (for example, see
Hancock & Munro, 1992).
When income standards are used, it will be necessary to define the maximum income
that households should spend on housing or the minimum income that households should
have available for other consumption. For the residual income approach, which is used in
this study, budget standards need to be more widely available than at present in order to be
able to identify the amount of minimum non-housing consumption that allows for decent
participation in society (for example, see Stone, 2006a). The user cost approach will also
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allow for such an analysis, if long-term affordability is confronted with life-long (or so-
called permanent) income (for example, see Hancock, 1993). Furthermore, both
approaches can be used in an income distribution analysis, exploring the redistributive
effect of expenses/costs and the subsidies involved (for example, see Frick & Grabka,
2003; Ritakallio, 2003).
Finally, households which under-consume housing involuntarily need to be identified,
as decent standard housing clearly is unaffordable for them. The identification of under-
consumption is especially relevant in the case of subsidy measures in order to be able to
target them well. Standards on dwelling quality and household composition need to be
combined with a price or rent for the dwelling in relation to household income, taking any
available housing equity into account in order to determine the amount of subsidization. A
challenge remains on the matter of household utility coinciding with the intended utility of
the subsidy.
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Notes
1 The choice of Flanders instead of Belgium was made because of the availability of the dataset.
2 Residual income is about the living standard of households after paying for housing consumption. This
clearly is its strength compared to the expense-to-income ratio that gives relative figures, which do not
have the same meaning in terms of consumption for low and high-income households. Further
advantages and disadvantages of both methods can be found in Hancock (1993), Hulchanski (1995) and
Stone (2006a).
3 To prevent the introduction of another concept, the paper will keep using the term ‘user costs’.
4 For the analyses of the results for tenants this choice is less relevant than for analyses of the results for
owner-occupiers. As owner-occupiers repay their mortgage, their housing expenses will be highest at
the point of acquisition, ceteris paribus.
5 The disposable income is divided by the sum of the weights for the household members in order to
make it ‘equivalent’ and comparable between different household types. The first adult has a weight
of 1, each additional adult in the household a weight of 0.5 and each child up to a maximum age of 15 a
weight of 0.3.
6 This is the only way to discuss subsidies, as the aim of the analyses was not to determine the extent of
subsidization according to some benchmark, e.g. the primary structure of the tax system (in order to
determine tax expenditures) or in comparison with market rents or market imputed rents or to achieve a
neutral subsidization of the different tenures (Haffner, 2002; Hancock & Munro, 1992; Hills, 1991;
Poterba, 1984, 1992; Thalmann, 2007).
7 In the Netherlands the average house price almost reached e223 000 in 2005; the range covered e165 000
for apartments to e370 000 for a detached single-family dwelling (Kadaster, http://www.kadaster.nl).
In Flanders the average house price of e162 400 in 2005 was lower than in the Netherlands. The price of
small and middle-large dwellings reached e139 600 in 2005. The price of apartments also reached e147
500 in 2005; for large dwellings e272 300 (Stadim, 2006). It should be remembered that the geographical
differences regarding price increases in both ‘countries’ are substantial.
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Appendix 1. Datasets and Variables Used
Datasets
For Flanders, the Housing Survey 2005 was used to calculate expenses and costs. This
survey was conducted by the Kenniscentrum voor Duurzaam Woonbeleid and included
5216 Flemish households. A weighting factor was applied to adjust the distribution of
dwelling type and district. For the Netherlands, the study used the Dutch Housing Survey,
the WoON 2006, a survey of the Ministry responsible for housing. The income data of
the tax administration of 2005 were coupled with the survey data. More than 60 000
households were interviewed. Weighting factors were applied to the sample, also to obtain
results for all Dutch households, which numbered almost 7 million. Based on the raw data,
the minimum number of necessary observations was set at 50 per cell, also for the Flemish
Housing Survey, in order to safeguard the statistical reliability and accuracy of the results.
For the Dutch data, there were no non-responses on income as they were based on
registration, while the Flemish data were based on a sample with a non-response rate of 33
per cent.
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Variables Used for Expense Calculations
The necessary variables for the expense calculations are directly available in the datasets.
Variables Used for Homeowners’ User Cost Calculations
For the user costs of owner-occupiers extra assumptions were added (see Table A1).
Technical Description of User Cost Analyses of Homeowners
Contrary to Equation 3, the costs of funding the value of the dwelling consists of equity
and debt. For the costs of the mortgage, the actual interest payments of households were
used. As flexible rate mortgages are more the exception than the rule in Flanders and the
Netherlands (DNB, 2008; NBB, 2009), the implied interest rates are rather more long term
than short term. For the costs of equity a long-term (10-year) interest rate was also used.
According to Himmelberg et al., (2005) this allows for the use of a constant rate of
expected future value change.
The constant rate of future value change of the dwelling was calculated ex post as the
average of the price changes over the five years preceding the reference dates of the
surveys used. This approach mirrors homeowners’ practice (Garner & Verbrugge, 2007;
Nordvik, 1995). For the Flemish data, a correction was not made for quality changes, as
quality improvements were not detected. For the Dutch data the repeated sales index was
used to calculate the specific price change: the price change of individual dwellings was
followed. The chosen period of five years may be considered too short a period in order to
estimate a structural value (Boelhouwer, 2000; Eichholtz, 1997), but it does give an
impression of the house price risk that the homeowner is running. As house prices were
historically high for Flanders (De Decker, 2007) in this period and were coming down
from a historical high in the Netherlands (Haffner & De Vries, 2009), the user costs
calculated may be underestimated for both countries.
The fact that in terms of Equation (4) the interest rates and expected value change were
not corrected for general price inflation does not come without a cost. Equation (4) more or
less presents the Dutch situation, as far as any of the imputed deductible holding costs are
included in taxable imputed rent. For Flanders, as the holding costs are not tax deductible,
the holding costs would not be part of the second term of the equation where this is not the
case. Using nominal rates of interest and value change means that user cost will be
underestimated for Flanders as well as the Netherlands. In Equation 4 when the real rates
of interest and value change are replaced by nominal ones, the addition of the inflation rate
is cancelled out in the first term of the equation. In the second term, the inflation rate will
be doubled, leading to an underestimation of the user cost with inflation corrected by the
tax rate. Average inflation rates were relatively low in 2005: it was 2.8 per cent in Belgium
and 1.7 per cent in the Netherlands.
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